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IMPORTANCE OF THE COST OF IDLENESS IN
EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES
Publications Department Note
Years of boom and depression have coincided with various events
in the life of the subject of this sketch, so that it is small wonder that
he is interested in the question of business cycles. He was born in
the year 1873, one of grave crisis and one that was succeeded by
five years of business depression. This early influence may account
for some of his interest in eliminating depressions.
Following the need of ending the depression of 1888, he entered
college in the fall of that year, and during the next three years business
continued on a good high level until his graduation in 1892, with the
degree of Bachelor of Letters. In that summer the gold reserves of
the United States were being depleted, supposedly due to the operation
of the Silver Coinage Act, but in the fall all fears were allayed when
the subject of this sketch continued his college work.
In the spring of 1893 he took a degree of Bachelor of Arts in the
traditional classical courses, and in June the panic of 1893 occurred
about the time of his second graduation. Recovery began again when
It was found that he would still continue at college, and in the spring
of 1894 heavy gold withdrawals from the United States Treasury con
tinued. The subject of this sketch in the meanwhile accumulated two
more degrees, one as Bachelor of Letters, and one as Master of Letters.
In the fall of 1894 he decided to continue in graduate work, study
ing economics, and business revived slightly until the spring of 1895
when he had gained the degree of Master of Arts. Returning to
college for further study in the fall of 1895, business continued on the
up-grade, but in the summer of 1896 depression again became prevalent
due to Wm. J. Bryan’s nomination, and the decision of the subject of
this sketch to end his school career and to go into business where
he could make some application of the knowledge he had accumulated
in the Halls of Notre Dame, and Johns Hopkins Universities.
Business picked up from that time and continued good until
1900, when there was a recession in business in the latter part of the
year. To end this recession, the subject of this sketch was made
Secretary of the Miller, DuBrul & Peters Mfg. Co., and business picked
up.
In the spring of 1901, the widespread strike of machinists affected
all the machinery interests of the country, and this strike naturally
had some effect on business. To prevent a further depression, the au
thor of this publication was made Vice-president, and later Commis
sioner of the National Metal Trades Association, in which capacity he
served until the summer of 1904.
In the meanwhile, in 1903 the injudicious speculation of certain
malefactors of great wealth had brought on the so-called Rich Men’s
Panic, and to end the subsequent depression, Mr. DuBrul gave up the
work of the Metal Trades Association and went back into business.
Business thereupon boomed until 1907, when some more injudicious
speculation among great interests in Wall Street brought the subse
quent depression of 1907.
This was a very severe depression, and it required drastic meas
ures to end it, so in that year, Mr. DuBrul was made Vice-president
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of the Miller, DuBrul & Peters Mfg. Co., and in the same year estab
lished the Pyro Clay Products Co., of which he has been the Presi
dent since its organization.
In 1915 when it was necessary to end the depression during which
the European War broke out, the subject of this sketch was made
President of the Miller, DuBrul & Peters Mfg. Co., in which capacity
he continued until 1919, when he sold his interests in that company.
Depression quickly followed, and in 1921 the author undertook the
work of General Manager of the National Machine Tool Builders’ As
sociation, and business revived and has been fairly prosperous ever
since.
In fact it has been so good for the rest Of the country, that even
the machine tool industry picked up some in 1923, but a good deal
remains to be done to set the stage for a long period of prosperity, so
the subject of this sketch is still on the job. Every one of these events
can be traced to fluctuations in the production of pig iron, which is
considered to be a first-class barometer of current events.
He thinks the work of a Trade Association Executive, acting as
consulting economist to a whole industry, is a man-sized job, particu
larly if that industry is suffering as a consequence of its efforts to end
the war by producing enough machinery to make enough shells, ships,
cannon, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks, and similar war material, in a few
months, to overcome the years of preparation that the Germans had
been indulging in.
If any one takes this sequence of events too seriously he ought
to be put to writing books about the bones and skulls of the prehis
toric man and other similar debris.
Owing to the fact that production is no longer at the peak and
that most industries are undergoing a process of readjustment, idle
ness, unnecessary and necessary, is an extremely important managerial
problem. This is especially true in equipment industries with which
the following article deals.

It is a regrettable and unpleasant fact that equipment indus
tries have always had periods of depression that were longer, deeper
and more severe than those of the industries they have served. It
is an habitual and equally unpleasant fact that the periods of pros
perity or boom have always been shorter for the equipment indus
tries than for their customers. Management has often bumped
into these facts with disastrous effects, as shown by the large pro
portion of failures in these industries.
Need of Economic Analysis
When it came to analyzing the causes for this disconcerting ir
regularity, the typical manager was about on a par with the African
medicine man giving his reason for an eclipse of the sun. He took
it as a visitation from some demon of business, who maliciously
stopped prosperity. But as eclipses were observed and observa
tions recorded astronomers worked out the causes of eclipses. As
the facts of depression and activity become recorded in statistics,
business analysts are piecing scattered information together into a
co-ordinate, logical explanation, which, of course, is still far from
complete.
In the course of such study some analysts have found statistical
evidence that equipment industries fluctuate more widely and more
rapidly in the business cycle than the industries for which equip
4

ment is built. Such analysts have concluded that these wide and
rapid fluctuations in activity are largely beyond the control of the
equipment builders.
But economic analysis has not come very largely within the
reach of the men operating these construction and equipment in
dustries. Managers of such industries are generally of the produc
tion or construction type and not of the financial or analytical type.
They have dealt with the physical side of their problems and not
with their economic aspects. As a result, the very industries whose
conditions have demanded the greatest amount of analysis have
received the least, much to their own detriment and to that of
society as a whole. Too often the problems of the construction
and equipment industries have been overlooked and fallaciously
considered as being of no great difference from those of the con
sumer goods’ industries.
In 1911, George H. Hull, a business man, wrote a book on “In
dustrial Depressions.”1 From a business man’s observations of
some facts and their influence on other facts, Mr. Hull pointed out
that construction industries seemed to be subject to peculiarly vio
lent and wide fluctuations in their demand. In 1913, Prof. Wes
ley C. Mitchell published a monumental study on “Business Cycles.”2
He traced the main causes and effects through various stages of
the cycle. In his book, Prof. Mitchell brought out statistical evi
dence pointing to the soundness of many of Mr. Hull’s conclusions.
In 1917 Professor J. Maurice Clark published an article,3 present
ing and analyzing some underlying reasons why demand for equip
ment should behave as it does.
The depth of the depression of 1920-1921 led many economists
and business men to give some of these causes much more con
sideration than they had ever been given before. A report on
“Business Cycles and Unemployment” was drawn up by one of the
Committees of President Harding’s Unemployment Conference.4 It,
too, brought out the necessarily bad load factor that confronts all
construction and equipment industries. In the late book by Pro
fessor J. Maurice Clark entitled “The Economics of Overhead
Costs,”5 the subject is further expanded.
Now that the analysts have explained these economic causes
and effects, it is up to the managers of equipment industries to con
duct their enterprises so that they will suffer less loss from these
necessary fluctuations than they have in the past. It will not do
for a man who is himself a “blue print hound” to impatiently dis1 “Industrial Depressions,” by Geo. H. Hull, F. A. Stokes Co., 1911.
2 “Business Cycles,” by Wesley C. Mitchell, published by the University of
California, 1913.
3 “Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand.” by J. Maurice Clark,
“The Journal of Political Economy,” March, 1917, Page 217.
4 “Business Cycles and Unemployment,” published for the National Bureau
of Economic Research by McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1923. See
Pages 12-13.
5 “The Economics of Overhead Costs,” by J. Maurice Clark, Pub. University
of Chicago Press. 1923. See Pages 389-396.
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miss the economic analyst as a “chart hound.” Hunters find need
for different kinds of dogs in pursuing different kinds of game.
They don’t set bird dogs to chasing rabbits, nor do they use rabbit
dogs in bird hunting. The business huntsman can use both the
blue print hound and the chart hound to advantage.
Why Production of Equipment Cannot be Stabilized
Let us see why demand for equipment must necessarily fluctu
ate more than demand for the product of the equipment. Suppose
that over a long period users of certain machinery were to have a
steady demand, no more and no less than their equipment is capable
of turning out. During that period this demand on the machine
builders is merely to replace physical wear out. But now suppose
that over another period, demand for this product recedes. The
users have more than enough equipment to supply their demand,
so they make good the wear-out by putting the idle machines to
work as the others wear out. During that time, their demand on
the machine builders is not as much as the actual wear-out of the
machines in use. So the plants of the machine builders are neces
sarily thrown into idleness, although the machine users may have
only a moderate recession in their demand. The machine builders
cannot resume work until the users have used up all the machines
that the recession in business left them as an excess supply. For
this reason, at the first clear sign of recession, the user stops buy
ing replacements, and thereby causes the equipment industries to
feel a recession long before consumer goods’ industries do.
But demand for staple commodities does not permanently stay
at any level. In the long run it would naturally grow at least in
proportion to the growth of population. In fact, it grows faster
than population, because by transfer of skill and intelligence from
men to machines, the equipment industries multiply human muscle
power. They thereby make possible the release of muscle workers
from production of some goods, and enable them to go producing
other goods not previously made. These causes create a natural
expansion demand for equipment, over and above the natural re
placement demand due to wear out.
Due to the vagaries of the business cycle, this normal growth,
however, is not regular. Industry is like the frog in the well who
got out by jumping up three feet and slipping back two feet. So
at times its expansion demand is much stronger than it would be
under a steady rate of growth. In such times, the expansion de
mand added to the deferred replacement demand makes a super
strong demand on the machine builder, thus violently magnifying
his fluctuation in operation.
For these reasons, equipment demand can easily be twenty
times as violent in fluctuation as the demand for the product of
the equipment. While this violent fluctuation adds zest to the pro
fession of managing the equipment industries, it greatly increases
6

the sporting chances of failure of the manager who refuses to
learn to ride this bucking steed of business.

Management Difficulties Intensified in Equipment
Industries
The very irregularity of demand makes some problems of man
agement more difficult in the equipment industries than in con
sumer goods’ industries, or in industries producing staple raw ma
terials. Take sales problems, for instance. Before any salesman
can book a firm order he must find a buyer who has both the abilityto-buy and the will-to-buy. When business is slack, the will-to-buy
is greatly weakened, even among those who have ability-to-buy, in
the shape of ready funds. No super-salesman has yet devised ways
to persuade many people to be fore-sighted, and to anticipate an
increased demand for their own goods when all the psychological
influences are giving everybody the blues. In some rare cases,
where an exceptionally strong mind is behind an exceptionally
strong cash reserve, some orders can be picked up. But every such
prospect is eagerly sought by every order-taker, as well as by every
salesman. The wisdom that leads such a prospect to purchase at
such times helps him to play one seller against another to his own
good advantage when it comes to price.
Then in a boom even the super-salesman would have quite a
bit of trouble to persuade men to hold back their orders when the
whole mob of order-takers are swearing that there never again will
be enough goods to go around. That is when the ill-informed and
over-enthusiastic insist on building new plants and installing more
machinery to make the profits they think they see ahead in limit
less amounts.
Since human nature is what it is, heavy orders for equipment
are thrown mostly on a high market, not on a low one. They come
with a rush at just about the worst time all round the cycle. Pro
ducing under those conditions, any equipment industry’s problems
of production are magnified in difficulty, and its cost problems are
likewise magnified. The labor market is about cleaned up, wages
are high, and efficiency of labor is low, because there are more
jobs bidding for men than there are men available. Good men
have long been employed elsewhere, and the construction and
equipment industries have to take what is left.
At the same time, materials of all kinds are high in price,
scarce in quantity, and irregular in delivery. Small orders are
sidetracked, so the equipment builders are tempted to overbuy and
so stick themselves with an excessive inventory when the inevitable
recession comes on. Interest rates are also highest at that time,
and money borrowed to carry the high inventory has to be paid back
some time. Overtime and other expenses of all kinds are highest,
due to the pressure to get out orders. Rush orders always cost a
lot more to get out than do those made on reasonable production
7

schedules. Not all those super-normal costs are anticipated and
provided for in the price, so that in very many cases the realized
profits fall far short of those anticipated when orders were taken.
Then at the first sign of recession some users will seek to cancel
orders for which the equipment builder has made commitments.
As some rash competitors will accept such cancellations under
threat of losing future business, similar pressure is put on the
sensible competitor who realizes that along that way lies suicide.
Any one who thinks this picture is overdrawn need only con
sult some reasonably sensible and experienced machine tool builder
who builds equipment for the builders of other equipment, and
whose problems are the ultimate of difficulty because of that very
fact.

Effect of Violent Fluctuations on Costs and Profits
We all know that costs and profits depend on three main fac
tors : 1, Production efficiency; 2, Amount of output; and 3, Price at
time of delivery. Each of these factors influences the other two
and is influenced by them in turn. Productive efficiency is neces
sarily affected by the amount of output that can be sold. For
some goods this amount depends very largely on the price itself;
for other goods price is not much of a factor. So price and output
have varying reactions on each other.
In equipment industries, the demand depends on the user’s
necessities, which in turn depend more on the demand for the prod
uct of the machine than on a small variation in the price of the
machine. The fact and the amount of interdependence of these
factors makes it vitally necessary that the business executive of a
highly fluctuating equipment industry should reckon on various
elements of cost that may not concern other industries very much.
It makes it necessary for his accountants and cost analysts to
clearly distinguish the kind and amount of various costs and profits.
He needs analysis of the sources from which costs and profits
arise, whether through productive efficiency, or through the general
course of demand and its consequent effect on output, or through
price changes. Without such analysis the executive too often gets a
mere coroner’s verdict that death was due to causes unknown. It is
much cheaper to invest money in diagnosis of the facts and applica
tion of necessary remedies than it is to pay for burials of owner’s
capital. The equipment industries are always in continuous need
of such analysis because of the very violence of their fluctuations.
The greater the fluctuation in demand, the more do the relations
change between constant and variable costs.
So it is no small job for the cost analyst to show where eco
nomics of increased output begin and end, to distinguish between
avoidable and unavoidable idleness and what each sort of idleness
costs, and to show to what point management may go in cutting
prices to buy business for the purpose of minimizing losses.
8

Cost Analysis as a Basis for Determining Managerial Policy
There is far too little cost analysis of the sort that management
can safely use in determining policy. Perhaps this is so because
the cost men have not themselves been educated up to the point of
showing all that they can and should get out of cost records. Real
cost analysis is no office boy’s job, nor is it the job of a mere pen
pusher. It requires brain work of the highest order. If industry
were steady, it would not be difficult to make true cost analyses.
Fluctuation increases both the necessity for and the difficulty of
cost analysis.
The losses of the years 1920 to 1922 are estimated by good
statisticians to have been from five to six billions of dollars. If
industry had spent a very few millions for better economic and cost
analysis, these losses could have been largely prevented. Consider
some of the features of the post-war boom, as illustrating wherein
such analysis would have helped. During that boom, it was not
the rise in costs that caused the losses. The losses came from the
way producers were caught in their commitments. At the height
of the boom, orders were taken at prices that were in line with
the costs, but “cancellitis” set in and left sellers stuck with inven
tories the replacement cost of which was heavily deflated by price
recessions during the slump. On the rising side of the boom, orders
were taken on a current basis of cost, but conditions changed
rapidly and actual costs of production turned out much higher
than the estimates. Material prices soared, wages soared, labor
efficiency fell, expense items of all kinds rolled up far beyond
anticipations, and when contracts were completed and paid for
they frequently registered losses instead of gains.
Likewise, when the slump came on, it was not the fall in costs
that was so important but how that fall caught the business man
in relation to his inventories and commitments. If heavily com
mitted or heavily stocked, and with little demand for his product,
it was not long before the same physical amount of stock was re
placeable at less direct cost for material and labor, through greater
efficiency of workers, as well as at decreased wages. Any com
petitor who had not overstocked or over-committed, sat in the
golden chair when it came to making prices. But the overstocked
machine builders had to meet such competition at a loss.
Some managers were not caught napping, either by the boom
or by the slump. Had there been more of that kind, there would
not have been such a wild boom, with its consequent penalty of
such a deep slump.
Managers of equipment industries need to be more than ordi
narily well informed as to the causes and effects of these wide
fluctuations in their branch of industry. Otherwise, they are likely
to do things that prevent their enterprises realizing the amount of
profit necessary to keep their industry in pace with the country’s
requirements. It will not suffice to merely pay a fair dividend on
an original investment. Intelligent managers know that unless
9

their enterprises keep pace with the country they will be surpassed
by others and finally drop out of the race through dry rot.
Humanity progresses in satisfying more and more of its
physical wants only as its equipment industries progress in their
true function of transferring skill and intelligence from men to
machines. The equipment industries, above all others, must be
conducted so that in the long run they can earn a considerable
surplus over mere dividend requirements. It is only from such
surplus that the equipment industries can finance research, new
developments, and new inventions for the benefit of the rest of
humanity. Equipment of all kinds must become larger and larger
if human wants are to be satisfied through greater and greater
production of consumer goods. That in itself requires equipment
shops to become larger and larger, and to be equipped with ma
chinery of progressively increasing size. This in turn, means that
larger and larger sums of surplus capital must be earned to build
the shops and to carry the increased length of process necessarily
accompanying the increased size of the product to be made.
Suppose that locomotive frames have increased four times in
length. The planer to plane them must be four times larger. It
will cost more than four times as much as a small planer, and it
will probably not turn out the large frame as fast as the small
planer did the small frames. The locomotive builder must earn
surplus enough over dividends to be able to finance the purchase of
the larger planer, or the railroads will not get the large locomotive
that will haul freight at so much lower cost per ton-mile. The
planer builder must also earn enough on small planers to finance
the building of bigger ones.
This necessity for providing increasing capital out of highly
fluctuating earnings means that the equipment industries need
financial and sales intelligence of the highest order. Well-known
economists have said that success or failure in manufacturing de
pends more on the manufacturer’s ability as a prophet than on
his ability as a producer. If this be true of manufacturers gen
erally, how much more it is true with respect to equipment
builders! How much more they must need the best information
available!
Managerial mistakes are much more likely to be serious in
widely fluctuating industries than in those of more steadily flowing
demand. For an equipment company that is financed largely with
borrowed money, a relatively long depression is likely to be disas
trous through pressure to meet obligations, just when the market
for its product is at the very worst. Even though there were no
added pressure to pay off old debts, if overloaded with inventory,
or if without good solid financial reserves, there is a pressure for
cash to keep an organization going.
Management not intelligent enough to properly finance an
enterprise is quite likely to try to buy orders at any price that
will help carry overhead, or help liquidate inventory. Naturally,
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such a policy reacts on competitors. No matter how well informed
they may be, they cannot give up the place in the sun that they
have obtained. They dare not risk losing their standing in the
trade. Against their better judgment they have no alternative but
to meet the distress prices made by the less skillful manager who
has gotten himself into a financial jam. So no matter how skillful
most of the managers may be, a cut-throating price war is easily
started and the skillful manager has to suffer for the mistakes of
the ill-informed as well as for any that he may make himself.
In some industries, moderate reductions in price do promptly
stimulate demand, and widen the market so that a greater physical
volume offsets the loss by price reduction. This characteristic has
been called the “Elasticity of Demand.” This elasticity varies
widely between different commodities, but in the equipment in
dustries, demand does not depend on price as much as it does in
other industries. Equipment demand is highly inelastic for the
reasons previously given, and even disastrous price-making cannot
get the whole market to respond with orders. Equipment is not
bought if and because it is cheap, but if and because the user
thinks he needs it to produce his own product in the volume his
customers require. Even though he were given equipment for
nothing, that gift would not affect the demand for his product.
For that reason, prices made out of line with reasonable costs of
production are useless in expanding equipment demand to any
appreciable extent.
In fact, price cuts have exactly the contrary effect on the user.
When prices are cut beyond the point justified by falling costs, the
user’s faith is shaken. He thinks there may be still further cuts
so he defers placing his order until no further cuts are forth
coming. He naturally questions the fairness of the previous level.
He knows about how much of a reduction may be fairly justified
by falling costs. He gives others credit for business sense and
expects to pay a price that will keep the seller on the job of supply
ing his wants. He cannot see how he can make money by selling
his own goods below cost. So when offered a price far below a
previous price, he naturally feels that the previous level must have
been extortionate and always thereafter will show more resistance
to any price made, no matter how the seller attempts to explain its
fairness.
If the equipment builder could expand the market as a whole
by taking a moderate loss, it would be a small price to pay for
the advantage to be gained by a policy of coaxing out demand.
But for the reasons already given, the demand is not stimulated,
even by price cutting that goes into the bone, and such deep cuts
merely increase the loss they are expected to reduce.
Besides their effect on the buyer’s mental reaction, such cuts,
have an equally important effect on the minds of competitors.
When price slashing goes beyond reason in any industry, it is not
long before a war is on to the hilt of the knife. A strong “fear
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complex” is generated in those who lose a fair amount of business
to one whose price is recognizably too low to be profitable. The
loser fears that his own position will be jeopardized. If the com
petitor succeeds in capturing enough business to keep his plant in
full operation without loss, he has a triple advantage. He
strengthens his position with the buyers, he runs without loss him
self, and increases the losses of those who do not get business. This
is altogether more than most men can bear, so the next move is to
make a still lower price to get back a share of the business going,
and to get enough more to make up for what was lost in the
beginning of the cut-throat fight.
See-sawing prices down is much easier than see-sawing up.
There is no telling where prices may go if the downswing becomes
heated by resentment at actions that are well known to be detri
mental to a whole industry. The force of the human fighting
instinct is added to that of the instinct of self-preservation and
such fights become very bitter. They have often led to disastrous
and weakened conditions that took many years for recovery. Such
price competition led to the organization of some of our largest
combinations. The U. S. Steel Corporation grew out of just such
a situation.
All industrial history confirms the experience and judgment of
seasoned business men, that except momentarily, the policy of
raiding a market at the expense of competitors has very few
chances for success, but has every chance of demoralizing and even
bankrupting whole industries.
Management in equipment industries is peculiarily susceptible
to temptation to try these disastrous policies. Until such industries
become organized in large units, the managers will be mostly of
the construction or production type, rather than of the analytical
or financial type. Men of the production type are prone to neglect
the financial side of their business. Statistics of failures show that
in numbers of failures and amount of liabilities, manufacturers of
machinery have led the parade for some time past. If managers
have small financial ability, is it any wonder that they get their
businesses into unhealthy shape? They make commodities where
bargain sales cannot clear out excess stocks of finished goods. Their
inventory is very poor collateral for loans. Under forced sale, the
realization value of finished parts is less than that of the raw
material from which they are made. Unless the parts are
assembled into finished machines, they are just scrap under the
hammer.
Necessarily, equipment plants must be built to take care of the
peak loads that the buying habits of their customers force on them.
Necessarily there is little or no hope of their developing off-peak
business. Therefore, the cost of idleness is a very important ele
ment in their total cost. Unfortunately, it is not so recognized to
any great extent, as the statistics of failures show. Even in times
of activity prices are often based on an idea of normal costs that
12

does not include the cost of idleness during these long periods of
cyclical dullness. If managers of electric light companies figured
only peak load costs as normal, the companies would all be finan
cially scuttled in a very short time.
It is seldom that the physical supply of finished equipment puts
price pressure on the market. It comes because during frequent
and long periods the capacity to produce equipment is in excess of
the off-peak demand. It is true that in boom times, even the peak
load plants may be unable to promptly supply equipment as fast
as users think they want it just then. But these times are never
as long as the periods when a surplus of capacity exists.
Improvement in the situation can come only with growing in
telligence of management. It involves greater analysis and study
of conditions, and better realization of the weaknesses to be
guarded against. It also involves more conscious and concerted
effort to educate equipment users to the greater cost of producing
equipment in peak load plants. If the importance of these matters
is realized, the user may eventually become more amenable to
arguments, and be led to improve his buying habits, and to look
forward a few months more than he does now. If equipment in
dustries could save a half of their present losses, and devote the
savings to research, our rate of mechanical progress would be
geometrically accelerated.
Much of this discussion may seem to be somewhat off the trail
of the work of the cost analyst, but his most important work is to
segregate the costs of idleness, to show his executive where their
trouble lies and show them the remedies. A high grade cost analyst
will develop some knowledge of the total market for the wares
made by the company. He will develop some way of knowing
what participation his company can expect to get out of any given
market, and why, and how. He will find some way of determining
whether his company is getting a normal participation and analyz
ing why it is getting the amount it receives. He will have full data
on costs, direct and indirect, and in that data he will set out clearly
the costs of idleness, distinct from the costs of producing goods.
He will have his idleness costs classified as between the necessary
and the unnecessary, so that the unnecessary can be eliminated by
internal betterments in methods. Then he will show how much
the necessary idleness influences cost, and give the responsible
executive a sound basis for price making. He will show what re
ductions in price are justified by reductions in costs. He will show
truly what losses and gains are due to administrative policy, dis
tinct from those due to shop efficiency or sales efficiency. This is
the work of a real cost analyst. The man who can do all that is
well worthy of a good salary.
Business has been so “chancey” in the past, that such work is
in greater demand than ever before. Running “by guess and by
God” is looked upon with increasing disfavor. The man who per
sists in doing it finds it less easy to convince bankers of a clear
13

title to a line of credit. Banks are beginning to study the relative
risks of different industries, as well as the relative capacity of
different managers. As the credit men’s science becomes better
and better, it will be increasingly difficult for the business igno
ramus to get away with mere bluff at knowing his business. That
bluff has run the failure loss up to figures much greater than the
annual fire loss.
Saving production wastes of various kinds, is a large job, but
saving financial waste is the biggest salvage job before the country
today. In this job, the real cost analyst will come into his own.
The man who can do a real job of analyzing will eventually be
found somewhere on the Board of Directors—where such men are
too often sadly missing.
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